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ALLIANCE NAVAL STRATEGIES AND NORWAY IN
THE FINAL YEARS OF THE COLD WAR
Commodore Jacob Børresen, Royal Norwegian Navy (Retired)
For those of us who served in the Norwegian armed forces, especially innorthern Norway, the 1980s were exciting times. Norway seemed to be the
focus of American and NATO attention. There was a continuous flow of
high-ranking visitors to Defence Command North Norway (DEFCOMNON),
from the staffs of Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Atlantic (ACLANT).1 Ev-
ery year thousands of allied soldiers, hundreds of aircraft, and dozens of ships
arrived in the area to conduct advanced training and complex exercises. High
points were the deployments of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, elements of Supreme
Allied Commander, Atlantic’s (SACLANT’s) Striking Fleet Atlantic, into north-
ern Norwegian coastal waters in Vestfjorden, outside Bodø: in 1985, USS Amer-
ica (CV 66) and, in 1987, USS Forrestal (CV 59) in Exercise OCEAN SAFARI; in
1988, USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) and Forrestal in TEAMWORK; and in
1989, America in NORTH STAR.2 We were witnessing, and took part in, what later
turned out to be the culmination of the Cold War—the period of tension that
eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Norway, neighbor to the So-
viet Union and a coastal state on the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea, found
itself at the geographical center of this final effort.
What is the relevance of these events today? First of all, it is part of our com-
mon recent history, which we do well to preserve and hand down to the genera-
tions that follow us. But the Soviet Union is gone, and with it the Cold War. The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been reorganized; with
SACLANT disestablished, it has only one supreme operational commander.
Nevertheless, the underlying assumption of this article, especially the second
part, is that the events in northern Norway in the 1980s provide insights with
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regard to joint and combined planning, exercises, and operations that are still
relevant to the United States and its allies as they prepare for coalition warfare
elsewhere in the world. Their value lies not only in how divergent interests and
differing opinions were handled between NATO supreme commanders. It has as
much or more to do with how to handle diverging interests between sovereign
allies and between sea-based and land-based commanders in situations where
land forces are reinforced or supported from the sea. The notion that in a com-
plex contingency, involving several sovereign nations and both sea-based and
land-based forces, a single American or allied commander can simply assume
operational command and get on with it may be simplistic.
The purpose of this article, then, is first to discuss some of the political chal-
lenges to the Norwegian government in the 1980s as a result of the increased im-
portance to NATO and the United States of the alliance’s northern flank. Sea
control in the Norwegian Sea was seen as crucial for protecting transatlantic sea
lines of communications and to taking out Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic-
missile submarines (SSBNs). Second, I will elaborate on some of the implica-
tions, primarily at the operational and tactical levels, for Norway and the
Norwegian armed forces of NATO’s Concept of Maritime Operations
(CONMAROPS) and the U.S. Maritime Strategy of the 1980s.3
GEOPOLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIC BACKGROUND
Since the early 1960s the United States and NATO had formulated their military
strategies and based their force and contingency planning on the doctrine of
“flexible response.”4 The doctrine rested upon the mutual recognition that the
United States and the Soviet Union both had the capability to destroy each other
and their respective allies with nuclear weapons; it was an expression of the need
to avoid a situation where the only response available to conventional aggression
was nuclear retaliation. The implication was a need to be able to conduct con-
ventional operations with an aim to deter hostilities or bring them to a halt prior
to escalation to nuclear war. An effect was to increase the importance of the
transatlantic lifelines, the ability of the United States to reinforce and resupply
its own forces and those of its allies in Europe by sea, across the Atlantic Ocean.
The world of the 1980s was one of violent peace. Cold War tension appeared
to be growing. At sea, the Soviet navy had grown significantly in strength and
showed increasing tendencies toward belligerence. The U.S. response generally
was to “roll back” the Soviet Union through greatly increased defense spending.
Its primary focus for planning and force building was opposition to the Soviets
in the European theater and support to NATO.5
As the Soviets increasingly based their nuclear deterrence on SSBNs, the ma-
jority of which were based on the Kola Peninsula, they needed to secure a wider
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maritime defensive zone in the Norwegian Sea. In the event of war, the SSBN
fleet would operate in the adjacent Barents Sea. Consequently, they saw, U.S. or
NATO naval forces could not be allowed to take command of the Norwegian Sea.
This Soviet mission of sea denial could require offensive action against Western
naval forces. It might also entail a ground assault on northern Norway itself, in
order to forward-base aircraft and help secure access for Soviet naval forces to
the Norwegian Sea.6
To NATO, this ability to push the maritime defensive zone farther and farther
out, potentially involving a ground invasion of northern Norway, was a danger-
ous new offensive factor in calculations of the balance of power, not only be-
cause NATO had to control these waters itself but because the allied perception
was fundamentally one of defense. Unless the alliance was able to secure Norwe-
gian territory, the Soviets would be in a favorable position to contest control of
the seas. By securing important forward positions in Norway, the Soviet Union
could deploy more effective land-based air cover for its naval forces.7 In short,
the loss of northern Norway could be decisive in the battle for the Atlantic.
Therefore, the support of the land battle in Norway by naval forces was critical.
The war could not perhaps be won at sea, but it could easily be lost there.8
NATO’s response was the Concept of Maritime Operations of 1980.
CONMAROPS highlighted the importance of containing Soviet forces through
forward operations, of conducting defense in depth, and of gaining and main-
taining the initiative at sea.9 CONMAROPS was based first on deterrence.
Should deterrence fail, the strategy was designed to mount a defense far forward
in order to protect the territory of the alliance’s European member nations.10
The concept bracketed NATO’s naval operations into five operational areas or
campaigns: the Mediterranean lifelines, the eastern Mediterranean, the Atlantic
lifelines, the “shallow seas,” and the Norwegian Sea. The three latter campaigns
involved Norway. At this time NATO was also developing elaborate contingency
plans for the rapid reinforcement of Europe in the event of an attack by the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact. Each of these plans had forces allocated to it. An elab-
orate exercise program was developed whereby each plan would be periodically
tested and the forces given opportunities to familiarize themselves with the plan
and the area of operations. But above all, the exercises in each of several series
served as deterrents in themselves, in the form of important political signals of al-
liance solidarity and shared credible will and ability to defend against attack.
The purpose of the Atlantic lifelines campaign was to protect the transporta-
tion of allied reinforcement and resupply across the Atlantic; the associated ex-
ercise series was known as OCEAN SAFARI. The shallow-seas campaign was
designed to prevent the exit of the Soviet Baltic Fleet into the North Sea and to
protect allied convoys in the North Sea and the English Channel; it was exercised
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in the NORTHERN WEDDING series. The Norwegian Sea campaign was meant to
prevent the exit of the Soviet Northern Fleet into the Norwegian Sea and the
North Atlantic and to provide sea-based support to allied air and ground opera-
tions in Norway. Its associated exercise series was TEAMWORK.11
The U.S. forward-oriented maritime strategy of the mid-1980s was drawn
from both NATO and American national military strategies, and it provided that
the U.S. Navy and Marines would wage global coalition warfare in conjunction
with the Army and Air Force and the forces of allied nations.12 As such, it dove-
tailed nicely with CONMAROPS, but in certain areas it went farther—for in-
stance, in the taking out of Soviet SSBNS; operation of carrier battle groups
(CVBGs) in coastal waters far forward, sheltered by the mountains surrounding
the northern Norwegian fjords; and the concept of horizontal escalation.
NATO’s and the Americans’ objectives in the Norwegian Sea were to repel a So-
viet amphibious assault on northern Norway, support northern Norway against
land threats, prevent Soviet use of facilities in Norway, and contain the Northern
Fleet or destroy it at sea.13 As opposed to CONMAROPS, which talked about
campaigns, the U.S. Maritime Strategy dealt with phases.
Phase I was called “transition to war.” In this phase there would be global for-
ward movement of U.S. naval forces. Nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs) would move into positions far forward, including the Arctic, deep inside
the Soviet sea-control and sea-denial areas. Battle groups would begin to form
into multicarrier battle forces. Forward-deployed amphibious task groups
would increase their readiness, and leading portions of a Marine amphibious
brigade would fly to Norway to join their prepositioned equipment. Other Ma-
rine air-ground task forces would begin loading out. Sealift of multiservice rein-
forcements would commence. Britain’s Royal Navy would send SSNs forward,
and a British antisubmarine warfare (ASW) task group, centered on at least one
carrier, would put to sea in the eastern Atlantic. British and Dutch marines
would reinforce Norway. Allied army deployments too were important to the
Maritime Strategy, including the movement of the British Mobile Force and the
Canadian Air-Sea-Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group to Norway.14
In Phase II the purpose was to seize the initiative, as far forward as possible,
preparatory to carrying the fight to the enemy. In the initial antiair warfare cam-
paign, carrier battle forces would engage Soviet air attacks as far forward as pos-
sible in “outer air battles,” to cause maximum attrition. Available land-based
tactical air (TACAIR) would complement these efforts in the Norwegian Sea.
Surveillance, intelligence, and raiding operations against command, control,
and communication sites by U.S. Special Forces and American and allied ma-
rines in Norway would be valuable supplements.15
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Phase III entailed carrying the fight to the enemy. Heavy strikes on the flanks
culminating in attacks on Soviet territory would be conducted as battle forces
massed and moved forward with reduced risk and higher confidence of success.
In this phase the U.S. Navy would be projecting power ashore in support of the
land battle. Amphibious operations would have the purpose of gaining leverage
for war termination, securing strategic choke points, and recovering territory
lost to Soviet attack.16
The desired culmination was war termination on favorable terms. This re-
quired putting such conventional (i.e., nonnuclear) pressure on the Soviets as to
convince them that they would find no benefit in continuing aggression and in
fact should retreat, while giving them no incentive to escalate to nuclear war. For
the U.S. Navy, exerting this pressure meant neutralization or destruction of the
Soviet navy and of ground and air forces on the Eurasian flanks, sea control, and
intervention in the land battle.17
IMPLICATIONS FOR NORWAY AND THE NORWEGIAN ARMED
FORCES
Prior to World War II, Norway’s foreign policy had been based on neutrality, or
nonalignment, a policy that went as far back as 1814. To the Norwegians, fight-
ing Nazi Germany, from 1940 to 1945, as part of an alliance was thus something
new. After the war there were strong political forces that wanted to return to a
policy of neutrality. Accession to NATO in 1949 came about only after a fero-
cious political debate. What finally decided the issue was the realization that in
the event of war between the United States and the Soviet Union, Norway would
be pulled into the conflict whether it wanted to be or not. Nevertheless, and de-
spite the fact that once the debate was concluded public support for NATO
across the political spectrum was consistently strong, Norwegian governments,
whether socialist or nonsocialist, had throughout the Cold War to balance care-
fully between policies of deterrence against and reassurance of the Soviet Union,
and between integration with and screening against NATO.18
The concrete expressions of these considerations were Norway’s base policy,
its nuclear policy, and a series of restrictions on allied exercise activity in Nor-
way. The base policy was first formulated in February 1949 in a note to the So-
viet government stating that Norway would “not enter into treaties with any
other states that contains an obligation to open up bases to the armed forces of
foreign states on Norwegian territory as long as Norway has not been attacked
or been subject to threats of an attack.” At the NATO summit in 1957, the Nor-
wegian prime minister, who was critical of NATO’s nuclear strategy, declared
that Norway would not store nuclear weapons on its soil in peacetime. In 1988
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Defence Minister Johan J. Holst further clarified Norwegian nuclear policy by
announcing:
In accordance with international agreements, Norway will not test, produce, or in
any other way attain, nuclear weapons; nuclear weapons will not be stored in or de-
ployed to Norway; Norwegian armed forces will not be trained in the use of nuclear
weapons; Norway will not enter into any cooperation agreement with an aim to
transfer nuclear weapons or information about nuclear weapons to Norway; special
storage sites for nuclear weapons will not be established in Norway; Norwegian
weapon systems will not be certified for use of nuclear munitions.19
In addition, throughout the Cold War there were limits on how many allied sol-
diers, aircraft, or ships could be present in Norway at any one time, in order not
to undermine the base policy. As a measure of reassurance for the Soviet Union,
allied units were not allowed to operate in the county of Finnmark, next to the
Soviet border, or from Norwegian airfields or harbors or at sea or in the air east
of twenty-four degrees east longitude.20
NORWEGIAN RESTRICTIONS AND THE U.S. MARITIME
STRATEGY
The American “rediscovery” of NATO’s northern flank in the 1970s and the re-
sulting reinforcement plans; prestocking of materiel, fuel, and ammunition; and
increased exercise activity in Norway in the 1970s and 1980s raised a political
debate in the country over the interpretation and practice of Norwegian restric-
tions—the nation’s nuclear and base policies and its constraints on allied train-
ing and exercises. At times the debate generated substantial pressure on the
Norwegian government and put limits on how far Norway could go to accom-
modate allied, primarily U.S. Navy, requirements for support. Of the many is-
sues that were affected by this debate and that caused problems for the
government and strained Norway’s relationship with the United States, I will
briefly mention five, in their relations to the country’s nuclear and base policies:
• Port visits of U.S. nuclear-capable ships and submarines
• Participation of nuclear-capable aircraft in training and exercises
• Prestocking for the U.S. Marine Corps
• Consequences for Norway of the concept of horizontal escalation
• Logistic support to the U.S. Navy by “forward operating locations”
(FOLs).21
Visit by Nuclear-Capable Naval Units. The provision in Norway’s nuclear policy
whereby nuclear weapons would not be stored in or deployed to Norway meant
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that visits by ships armed with nuclear weapons could constitute violations of
that policy. In 1975 the prime minister, Trygve Bratteli, formulated what has
been called the “Bratteli doctrine”: “Our assumption, as foreign ships visit, has
been and is that nuclear weapons are not carried on board. Norwegian authori-
ties anticipate that allied, as well as other nuclear powers, respect this assump-
tion.” The doctrine thus took into account both the fact that warships, under
international law, cannot be inspected by foreign states and that Western nuclear
powers, by policy, neither confirmed nor denied that their ships were carrying
nuclear weapons. The Bratteli doctrine was no more than a codification of es-
tablished practice, but it nevertheless evoked strong reactions by the allied nu-
clear powers and by Norway’s own Chief of Defence, General Zeiner Gundersen.
He feared that the doctrine would lead to a sharp reduction in the visits by allied
ships. The doctrine was thus allowed to slip silently into oblivion. In the early
1980s, reference to it was omitted from statements of diplomatic clearance of
visits to Norway by foreign warships.
When Johan J. Holst was appointed Minister of Defence in 1986, he decided
to reinstate the doctrine, by once more referring to it in diplomatic clearances is-
sued for ship visits. The American reaction was immediate and strong, and Holst
had to back down and accept a compromise whereby reference to the doctrine
was only indirect. In 1992 Holst reversed his policy on this issue completely, stat-
ing that “Norway cannot conduct a policy whereby its allies must prove that they
are not criminals.”22
The Participation in Exercises of Nuclear-Capable Aircraft. In accordance with
the limitations on allied exercises in Norway, the government put restrictions on
the number and types of allied aircraft that could operate at any one time from
Norwegian airfields or in Norwegian airspace. In particular, the government had
problems with regard to nuclear-capable aircraft: the B-52 long-range bomber,
the F-111D fighter-bomber, and the A-6 Intruder light bomber.
In Exercise ANORAK EXPRESS in March 1980, for example, B-52s based in
Britain were to simulate attacks on targets in Norway and then return to base,
without having landed on Norwegian soil. The mission was stricken from the ex-
ercise by the Norwegian government, and a general rule was established for later
exercises whereby B-52s could participate only in other than offensive roles, only
versions of the aircraft not certified or equipped to deliver nuclear weapons
could take part, and B-52s would not land in the country other than in an
emergency.
The F-111D was part of NATO’s intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) and
also of the strategic reserve of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
(SACEUR). In this latter role it could be deployed all over ACE. When SACEUR’s
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plan for cross servicing these aircraft at Norwegian airfields came up for ap-
proval in November 1983, the conservative Kåre Isaachsen Willoch government
demanded that F-111Ds be omitted from the plan as far as Norway was con-
cerned. Like the B-52, the F-111D was so prominently associated with NATO’s
nuclear strategy that regular visits to Norway by these aircraft or their inclusion
in the allied plans for the country’s defense would have been seen as eroding the
Norwegian nuclear policy.
The A-6 Intruder, a nuclear-capable light bomber, also created problems for
the Norwegian government. The aircraft was, for instance, initially not allowed
to exercise in Norway, and storage of heavy equipment associated with the A-6
was excluded from the 1981 U.S. Marine Corps prestocking agreement, on the
premise that storage sites containing an offensive capability like the nuclear-
capable A-6 would be regarded as unacceptable provocations to the Soviet Union,
by both the Soviets and the Norwegian public. But the A-6 was an integral part
of the U.S. Marine Corps’s inventory, and as Marine exercise participation in
Norway increased in frequency and volume, regular involvement by A-6s be-
came unavoidable. The first time A-6s in the air-to-ground role took part in an
exercise in Norway was in TEAMWORK 1984, where they operated out of Bodø in
northern Norway. Previously they had operated only out of Ørland, much fur-
ther south in central Norway in the electronic-warfare role. This proved to be a
breakthrough. From then on and well into the 1990s, the A-6 was a regular par-
ticipant in NATO exercises in Norway, without causing political problems of any
kind to the government.23
Prestocking for a U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Brigade. In 1981 American
and Norwegian authorities signed an agreement to store the heavy equipment of
a U.S. air-landed Marine expeditionary brigade (known as the NALMEB) in the
central Norwegian county of Trøndelag. The original plan was to store the
equipment in northern Norway, which was where the brigade would operate if it
were deployed. This was hindered by strong political opposition in Norway, and
a compromise solution had to be found farther south. As compensation, the
heavy equipment for South Norwegian Brigade 6 was stored in the north. Also,
the Marine brigade’s air element was allowed to fly directly to its designated air-
fields in the north. The net result was thus a considerable strengthening of the
defense of northern Norway.
What was the opposition to prestocking for the Marines in northern Norway
all about? First, there were those who opposed any prestocking in Norway for the
U.S. Marine Corps. Second, there were those who supported it in principle but
not in northern Norway. The general opposition to prestocking must, I believe,
be seen as a repercussion of the broad and general political opposition in
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Norway to the war in Vietnam. The war, which had ended in 1975, was still fresh
in memory. Also, the Marine Corps was seen as the epitome of American expedi-
tionary capability; Norwegian politicians feared that prestocking its equipment
would pull the country into American global strategy. There were also those who
felt that storing equipment for foreign troops could undermine the Norwegian
base policy, while others pointed to the fact that because the brigade was nuclear
capable, the presence of its equipment would represent a challenge to the na-
tion’s nuclear policy.
Those who supported prestocking in principle but opposed it in northern
Norway feared that a storage site there would provoke the Soviets and thus be
contrary to the long-standing Norwegian policy of low tension in the north.
This, by the way, was a general problem with the Maritime Strategy, as many
Norwegians saw it. For the Norwegian government, which wanted to tie the
United States to the defense of Norway, on the one hand, and on the other to
minimize internal debate and political division over defense and security policy,
handling the strategy was a difficult balancing act.24
Horizontal Escalation. In 1978 the dean of the Center for Advanced Research (as
the present Center for Naval Warfare Studies was originally known) at the U.S.
Naval War College, at Newport, Rhode Island, Francis J. “Bing” West (who, by
the way, had participated with John Lehman in the development of “Sea Plan
2000,” the precursor to the Maritime Strategy), coined the phrase “horizontal es-
calation.” The phrase signified a concept whereby the U.S. Navy could improve
the American bargaining position against the Soviet Union in the early stages of
a war by forward maritime operations against the Soviet navy, including its stra-
tegic submarines, the SSBNs, thus confronting the Soviets with a choice between
nuclear escalation and termination of hostilities.25 When the Maritime Strategy
started to materialize in the 1980s, the idea of horizontal escalation surfaced in
the Norwegian debate. If the United States were to respond to a conflict with the
Soviets in, let us say, the Persian Gulf by attacking the Northern Fleet base area
on the Kola Peninsula, close to the Norwegian border, would that be in Norway’s
interest and in line with the Norwegian policy of low tension?
In 1986 Johan Holst feared that the U.S. naval strategy could result in Soviet
pressure on the Scandinavian countries and in inadvertent escalation to nuclear
war. He warned against what he called a “mediterraneazation” of the Norwegian
Sea (referring to the permanent presence in the Mediterranean of both the U.S.
Sixth Fleet and units of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet). At the same time, however,
Holst was engaged in securing regular allied naval presence in northern waters,
as that could reduce Soviet dominance and induce restraint on both sides. Again
we see the double dichotomy of deterrence and reassurance of the Soviets and of
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integration with and screening against allies—that runs as a bright line through
Norwegian Cold War defense and security policy.26
Logistic Support to Striking Fleet Atlantic. An important lesson learned from
the participation of the America CVBG in OCEAN SAFARI in 1985 was the need
to establish logistic support in the shape of forward-located depots of fuel and
ammunition. For instance, the SACLANT fuel depot in Namsen, in central
Norway, which had been established in 1983, held enough for only three days’
consumption. In September 1985 the commander of Striking Fleet Atlantic
(COMSTRIKFLTLANT), Admiral Henry C. “Hank” Mustin, USN, brought the
matter up with Norwegian authorities. It was a subject that was going to haunt
them for years, right up until the end of the Cold War, and that would put con-
siderable strain on U.S.-Norwegian relations.
In the summer of 1987, American authorities approached Norway’s Ministry
of Defence with a request to establish FOLs for logistic support to the U.S. Navy
along the Norwegian coast. The Norwegians wanted to postpone the question;
the Americans were indignant at this lack of support. In 1989, after considerable
U.S. pressure, the Norwegian government went along and initiated negotiations
on the subject. The American proposal included four different measures. First
was establishment of forward-located ammunition and fuel depots at Bodø. The
second was provision of airfields and seaports suitable for the reception and on-
ward movement to ships of replenishment stores and spare parts. The Værnes
airport and Trondheim harbor in central Norway were identified as candidates.
Third, there was a need for an FOL farther north. Brønnøysund, where there was
a modern jetty with a deep berth and easy access to the open sea, was seen as the
best alternative. It was located close to an airport, though its runway would have
to be extended somewhat and an aviation fuel depot would have to be built.
Fourth, agreement had to be reached on the earmarking and preparation of war-
time ship-repair facilities. The U.S. Navy had already secured agreement with
five shipyards in Norway for peacetime support; similar agreements had to be
closed for wartime use. Not until 1991 was the Norwegian government ready to
approve a modified logistics agreement. But by this time the Cold War was over,
Striking Fleet had left the Norwegian Sea, and SACLANT was no longer
interested.
And that was precisely why Defence Minister Johan Jørgen Holst and the
Norwegian government had dragged their feet on the subject in the first place.
Holst knew that the deployment pattern of the U.S. Navy was according to
American needs, not Norway’s wishes. He had observed that American strike
carriers had been conspicuously forward deployed in the Norwegian Sea in the
1950s but had disappeared in the early 1960s when submarines took over the
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nuclear-deterrence role. Now the U.S. Navy was back in the Norwegian Sea as a
result of the forward maritime strategy, but he had no guarantee that this new
engagement would last. On the contrary, strategies invariably change as political
situations change and create new requirements and as developments in weapons
technology bring forward new capabilities.
The considerable allied military presence in Norway in the 1980s—on aver-
age around ten thousand personnel in training and over fifteen thousand in-
volved in exercises per year, in addition to a large number of ships and aircraft
—had created an impression that allied soldiers were almost continually present
in Norway and that this constituted an erosion of Norway’s base policy. More-
over, the exercises and training had reached the limit of what Norway was able to
support and still maintain control over the activity. In this situation, to rally suf-
ficient political and popular support for the establishment of forward operating
locations—a euphemism for forward bases—for the U.S. Navy required unusual
political skill, and a positive result would come only at a considerable political
price. It was a price Holst was not willing to pay, since the chances were that no
sooner would the FOLs be in place than the U.S. Navy would leave once
more—which, of course, is exactly what happened.27
STRIKING FLEET ATLANTIC IN NORTH NORWEGIAN WATERS
Let me now turn to some implications for the defense of Norway at the opera-
tional and tactical levels. A concrete expression in Norwegian waters of the U.S.
forward maritime strategy was the deployment of Striking Fleet Atlantic to the
northern Norwegian Sea and into the coastal waters of northern Norway. Strik-
ing Fleet (STRIKEFLT) was organized in four subordinate commands: the car-
rier, ASW, amphibious, and Marine strike forces.28 STRIKEFLT thus contained
naval, air, and ground forces, and it was capable of establishing sea control and
air superiority as a basis for force projection ashore.
Accordingly, its routine deployment to northern Norway represented an
enormous boost to the defense of the region, for three reasons. First, it contrib-
uted convincingly to deterrence, in that it demonstrated American determina-
tion and ability to defend Norway, not through altruism but for reasons of U.S.
security. Moscow would have to regard it as highly probable that an attack on
Norway would mean war with the United States. Second, it constituted a crucial
contribution to the defense of Norway. The operation of STRIKEFLT, with its
two or three mutually supporting CVBGs, in the Vestfjorden and adjacent ocean
areas meant allied sea control and air superiority along the Norwegian coast at
least as far north as Lyngen Fjord, the northernmost of the fjords that penetrate
deep into the key defensive positions of the Norwegian army in inner Troms
County. Depending on the number of CVBGs, Striking Fleet’s presence off the
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Norwegian coast constituted a doubling of the number of air-defense fighters
and a tripling of the number of fighter-bombers available to Commander, De-
fence Command North Norway (COMNON).29 The most dangerous potential
Soviet course of action in the event of war was considered to be an amphibious
assault into the northern fjords to outflank the Norwegian army or attack it in
the rear, in coordination with a simultaneous frontal assault on the defensive
line between Lyngen Fjord and the Finnish border. Deployment of STRIKEFLT
to the area would make such an assault a very risky undertaking.
Third, the planning and execution of complex joint and combined operational-
level exercises that included integration of land-based and carrier-based air and
amphibious landings raised the proficiency of COMNON’s staff and of the Nor-
wegian armed forces in general. Operations at the tactical level in the extremely
target-rich environment of the major NATO exercises in northern Norway con-
tributed to the efficiency and morale of Norwegian units on the ground, at sea,
and in the air.
But there were challenges too. They were a result of deploying STRIKEFLT into
a zone “up threat” (that is, in the direction from which the threat was expected)
that was already the area of responsibility (AOR) of a “principal subordinate
NATO commander,” namely, COMNON, who had substantial naval, air, and
ground forces under his own control. The complications were primarily related to
airspace and water-space management and coordination in order to ensure the
safety and security of “own units” and avoid “blue on blue” engagements while at
the same time allowing the forces to fight effectively. The challenges can be grouped
in four categories:
• Coordination and deconfliction of land-based and carrier-based air defense
• Shape and size of the amphibious objective area
• Employment of Marine air-component aircraft in support of COMNON’s
air campaign
• Coordination and deconfliction of COMNON and COMSTRIKFLTLANT
naval operations in coastal waters.
In addition, there were issues regarding the conduct of complex joint and com-
bined exercises in northern Norway in peacetime in such a way as to avoid acci-
dents involving civilians and damage to civilian property. I shall briefly
comment on each of these issues.
Land-Based and Carrier-Based Air Defense. As carrier battle groups approached
the coast of northern Norway, their “outer defense zones,” which could extend as
far as three hundred nautical miles from the carriers themselves, would start to
overlap COMNON’s airspace.30 As the carriers were under the command of
1 0 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWC_Review_Spring2011.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Spring2011\NWC_Review_Spring2011.vp
Monday, February 14, 2011 4:09:12 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss2/7
SACLANT but COMNON was under SACEUR, there was no higher-up com-
mand with overriding authority to take on overall responsibility for airspace
management. This was nothing new. For many years, operating in the waters be-
tween Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom (then famous as the “GIUK
gap”), U.S. CVBGs had experienced the same problem in relation to the United
Kingdom’s air-defense region. The U.S. Navy of the 1980s strongly preferred to
plan for and exercise coordinated, cooperative, and deconflicted (but separate)
sea-based antiair and strike campaigns rather than integrated TACAIR opera-
tions over both the land and sea under one powerful, central operational theater-
air commander—who would likely be, in many important scenarios, a U.S. Air
Force officer.31
The result had been the so-called CADIMS (Coordinated Air Defense in
Mutual Support) agreement between British and American authorities, with
procedures for the deconfliction of carrier- and land-based air. CADIMS was
now used as a template for a similar agreement between COMNON and
COMSTRIKFLTLANT. The concept was simple; the agreement essentially di-
vided the airspace between the two and set forth special procedures for aircraft
of one command that for some reason had to enter the airspace of the other.
For exercise purposes in peacetime, the dividing line ran parallel to the Norwe-
gian coast; COMSTRIKFLTLANT had control of the airspace to seaward. This
allowed COMNON to carry out his responsibility for the defense of Norwe-
gian airspace prior to war. In a wartime situation the delineation of COMNON
and COMSTRIKFLTLANT airspace would probably have run east to west,
with SACLANT responsible up threat.32
Shape and Size of the AOA. In an amphibious assault, U.S. doctrine gave the
commander of the amphibious strike force complete control at sea, on the
ground, and in the air within the “amphibious objective area,” the AOA. This
control included, as a minimum, coordinating authority over all friendly units
within the AOA. The AOA had to be large enough to allow for effective self-defense.
Moreover, operational control over the Marine strike force, including its air
component, would not pass to COMNON until the amphibious objective had
been obtained. That could, realistically, take at least a week, often more. Conse-
quently, when American planners arrived at COMNON planning conferences
convened to organize amphibious assault exercises in Troms, they presented
AOAs that encompassed all of COMNON’s key defensive area in that county,
plus the northern parts of Nordland County and large chunks of northern
Sweden.
If it had been only a question of the defense of a generic country against a ge-
neric threat, as in NATO exercises today, this would not have been a big problem.
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But NATO’s exercises in northern Norway during the Cold War were designed to
test and refine NATO’s contingency plans for war with the Soviet Union. Con-
cepts and procedures for exercises had therefore to be as close to the real thing as
peacetime safety regulations and political considerations (such as the necessity
to avoid violation of Swedish airspace) would allow. To COMNON it was unac-
ceptable to turn over to an allied commander (who might not even be under
NATO command) control over his own key areas—where his entire anti-invasion
force of four to six mechanized infantry brigades and a considerable number of
naval ships, submarines, and fighter aircraft would be concentrated—in order
that a single light Marine amphibious brigade could deploy. It did not make the
situation easier that, according to plans, elements of the amphibious brigade’s
air component could deploy to northern Norwegian airfields immediately prior
to or during the landing, when the shift of operational control to COMNON had
not yet taken place.
To further complicate the issue, the amphibious commander would be a for-
eigner, with much less knowledge and experience of operations in the highly de-
manding terrain and climate of northern Norway than COMNON and his
subordinate commanders. At the same time, it was unacceptable to the amphibi-
ous commander to land his units on the beach without being certain that he
would be able to defend them effectively in the vulnerable landing phase before
the amphibious brigade had time to regroup and get ready for combat ashore.
Even if the assumption was that the amphibious brigade would land prior to
hostilities breaking out, the very fact that it had done so would make the political
situation so tense that hostilities could break out at any moment.
The issue of the AOA in northern Norway first went onto the agenda in the
NATO command-post exercise WINTEX 1975. A solution that was acceptable to
both parties would have to be based on confidence on the part of the Americans
that COMNON had sufficient control in his area of responsibility that the size of
the AOA could be reduced and its shape tailored to the geography in such a way
that COMNON’s units would not be unduly hindered in their movements while
the amphibious landing was in progress. But a solution on those lines was not
found until TEAMWORK 1984, and luckily we will never know whether the
Americans would have accepted it in a real situation.33
Marine Aircraft in Support of COMNON’s Air Campaign. In accordance with its
operational concept, a U.S. Marine air-ground task force, or MAGTF, is an or-
ganic whole, and its air and ground combat components are integral parts that
cannot be separated.34 COMNON, on the other hand, considered that the U.S.
Marine brigades could be more effectively employed in the defense of northern
Norway if the ground combat component were placed under tactical command
of the Norwegian 6th Division and the air component were under his own air
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component commander, COMAIRNON, and integrated in the COMNON air
campaign.
This was emphatically rejected by the Americans. It would constitute an un-
acceptable violation of their doctrine. Also, according to current plans,
COMNON was allocated only operational control over the U.S. Marine brigade,
and that did not include authority to divide it. COMNON had to give in on this
point and accept that his ability to use his entire defense force in an optimal and
flexible way, especially in the air, would be somewhat reduced. Anyway, given the
considerable fighting capability of the Marine brigade, the net effect on the de-
fense of Norway would be positive, compared to not getting the brigade at all. In
the years of exercising together that followed, as mutual confidence and respect
between Norwegian and American personnel increased, the Americans found it
possible to compromise just a little: “excess sorties,” ready sorties not employed
by the Marine force commander in direct support of his force, were made avail-
able to COMNON for his air campaign.
Coordination and Deconfliction of Naval Operations. As noted, the boundary
between SACLANT’s and SACEUR’s areas of responsibility ran parallel to the
Norwegian coast, only a few nautical miles out.35 As Striking Fleet crossed the
line and approached the Norwegian coast, however, it did not change opera-
tional command or control to SACEUR but operated in accordance with current
NATO procedures for “cross boundary operations.” They required that all
STRIKEFLT units establish radio communications with COMNON in order to
report their positions and intended movement and to receive information about
friendly units in the area, recognition procedures, IFF (identification, friend or
foe) settings, and so on.
This was absolutely crucial in order to avoid blue-on-blue engagements. Es-
pecially along the coasts of northern Nordland and Troms Counties, every inlet
was covered by powerful artillery units, gun and torpedo batteries, and mine-
fields. Numerous fast missile and torpedo boats and coastal submarines would
also be employed as part of Norway’s anti-invasion scheme. In a real instance of
the kind of scenario we are talking about, where STRIKEFLT had deployed in the
defense of Norway against imminent attack from the Soviet Union, all Norwe-
gian naval units would be on high alert and authorized to fire at darkened war-
ships that entered territorial waters without responding to calls on the radio.
Striking Fleet surface combatants and underway replenishment ships that en-
tered Norwegian coastal waters prior to the arrival of the high-value units—for
precursor operations, replenishment of fuel and stores, or other reasons—with-
out listening on the appropriate radio frequencies or responding correctly when
challenged would immediately be shot out of the water.
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Our concern was that what you do not regularly exercise and practice in times
of peace, you will probably not automatically practice in the first phases of crisis
and war, until you have learned your lesson the hard way. Another concern, from
COMNON’s perspective, was that this lack of adherence to agreed procedure re-
duced the value of the exercises to all participants and had a demoralizing effect
on Norwegian naval and coast-artillery personnel, to whom the chance to inter-
act with powerful allied units was something they had looked forward to im-
mensely and prepared themselves for with enthusiasm.
In all the exercises I took part in or was involved with—and that is the major-
ity of all the exercises carried out from 1968 until 1993—allied warships, espe-
cially those of the U.S. Navy, did not take this seriously. They very rarely
responded to radio calls and generally ignored the presence of minefields. In a
real situation, that could have proved catastrophic—but then, they probably
would have learned quickly.
The Planning and Conduct of Major NATO Exercises. Running a complex, mul-
tinational live exercise in an area not closed to the general public is like putting
together an intricate jigsaw puzzle. To prevent unnecessary traffic jams and road
accidents, to keep ships from steaming into fishing nets, and in other ways to
avoid damaging or hindering civilian activities is challenging enough. But the
most daunting task was devising an exercise in the air that was sufficiently chal-
lenging to all participants but neither posed hazards or unnecessary restrictions
on military sorties or civilian air traffic nor created a diplomatic scandal by re-
peated violations of Swedish airspace. It added to the complexity that Soviet air-
craft routinely operated within or adjacent to that part of the exercise area that
stretched into international airspace. The Soviet presence constituted a poten-
tial safety risk. It was necessary to allocate sorties in order to intercept and
shadow the Soviet aircraft, and these sorties had to come out of the exercise air
tasking order.
All air movement had to be meticulously planned in order to avoid low flying
or breaking the sound barrier over inhabited areas or in the vicinity of fur farms.
The whole setup had to be coordinated with the civilian air traffic routes—
something that represented a challenge of its own, as civilian and military air-
craft operated from the same airports and the airspace over Nordland and Troms
is not large. The airspace was further limited in that military aircraft were al-
lowed to approach the Swedish border no closer than twenty nautical miles.
Nevertheless, through the 1970s and ’80s, up until 1988, there were annually one
or two violations of Swedish airspace, each an embarrassment to the Norwegian
government.
The NATO exercises at times stretched the capacity of the civilian air-traffic
control system to the limit. A special problem was keeping track of, and
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deconflicting, carrier-based air under COMSTRIKFLTLANT and land-based air
under COMNON. The combination of limited radar coverage and a shortage of
civilian air controllers led to a situation where the traffic control system was un-
able to cover the large NATO exercises and at the same time deal with civilian
traffic. During Exercise OCEAN SAFARI in September 1987, Scandinavian Air
Lines had to cancel two daily flights between Oslo and northern Norway; the
Ministry of Transport decided to close Norwegian airspace between Bodø and
Alta, in Finnmark, to civilian traffic every morning and evening for the duration
of the exercise.36
{LINE-SPACE}
The U.S. Maritime Strategy and NATO’s Concept of Maritime Operations put
Norway on both Brussels’s and Washington’s military strategic maps in an un-
precedented way. It contributed to increasing the credibility of American and
NATO deterrence of the Soviet Union. It redressed the extremely unfavorable
force balance between the Soviet Union and Norway, on the alliance’s northern
flank, and it brought considerable NATO infrastructure investment to Norway
in the form of fuel and ammunition storage sites, hardened aircraft shelters, im-
proved runways, communications and aircraft early-warning equipment, and
the like. It also brought exercise activity that contributed to a considerable in-
crease in the knowledge and proficiency of Norwegian defense planners and
operators.
Nonetheless, this strategic centrality constituted a challenge to Norway’s pol-
icy of low tension in the northern region and to such key elements of the nation’s
defense and security policy as its base policy, nuclear policy, and restrictions on
allied exercise activity. It thus became the source of fierce internal debates over
Norway’s defense and security policy. These were debates that successive Norwe-
gian governments sought to avoid, as it was believed that for a small country in
an exposed strategic position to indulge in visible political divisions over its de-
fense and security policy would only contribute to further weakening of that
position.
The U.S. Maritime Strategy and CONMAROPS thus presented the Norwe-
gians with a difficult task of balancing between, on the one hand, tying the
United States firmly to the defense of Norway and, on the other hand, trying to
minimize internal debate in a population traditionally skeptical of what it per-
ceived as American interventionism. Alliance strategy in this way brought to the
fore and made visible the recurring theme of a double dichotomy in Norwegian
security and defense policy—that of deterrence and yet reassurance of the Soviet
Union, and that of integration with and screening against allies—that ran as a
thread through Norwegian Cold War defense and security policy from begin-
ning to end.
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NOTE S
The article is based on a presentation by the
author to the Cold War Oral History Confer-
ence at Bodø, Norway, on 21 August 2007.
1. At this time Commander, Defence Com-
mand North Norway, COMNON, a Norwe-
gian three-star general, was “double hatted”
as national commander, subordinate to Chief
of Defence Norway, and as an allied “princi-
pal subordinate commander” in the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) chain
of command. The boundary between Su-
preme Allied Commander, Atlantic’s
(SACLANT’s) area of responsibility
(ACLANT) and that of SACEUR (ACE) ran
parallel with the Norwegian coast just a few
nautical miles out to sea. A major part of
NATO’s air reinforcements, and all of
NATO’s naval and amphibious reinforce-
ments to northern Norway, were, however,
SACLANT forces. As units of SACLANT’s
Striking Fleet crossed into ACE and ap-
proached the Norwegian coast, they did not
immediately or necessarily change opera-
tional command or control to SACEUR but
generally operated in accordance with cur-
rent NATO procedures for “cross boundary
operations.” For the purpose of submarine
operations and naval surveillance, COMNON
acted as a functional commander in the
SACLANT chain of command.
2. The last Cold War deployment of U.S. carri-
ers to Norwegian coastal waters prior to these
had been in the NATO exercise MAINBRACE
in 1952, when USS Midway (CVB 41) and
USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVB 42) took
part. Deployment of U.S. carriers into the
Norwegian Sea was, on the other hand, not
uncommon. From February 1954 U.S. carri-
ers were incorporated into American plans
for strategic nuclear warfare. This meant reg-
ular deployment into the Norwegian Sea to
prepare for the offensive nuclear-strike role
in the event of war with the Soviet Union.
These deployments subsided with the intro-
duction of the SSBN to the U.S. Navy from
1964 onward. Between 1964 (Exercise
TEAMWORK) and 1985, U.S. carriers would
regularly participate in NATO exercises in
the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea,
carrying out air interdiction missions and air
support to forces on the ground in North
Norway from positions out to sea. Rolf
Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War
in the High North (Oslo: ad Notam forlag AS,
1991); Joel J. Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nu-
clear Age: The United States Navy and NATO,
1949–80 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1991); Kjetil Skogrand, Norsk
forsvarshistorie [Official History of Norway’s
Defense Forces], vol. 4, 1940–1970 (Bergen:
Eide forlag, 2004); and Jacob Børresen,
Gullow Gjeseth, and Rolf Tamnes, Norsk
forsvarshistorie [Official History of Norway’s
Defense Forces], vol. 5, 1970–2000 (Bergen:
Eide forlag, 2004).
3. The U.S. Maritime Strategy was signed by the
Chief of Naval Operations on 4 May 1984.
For an extended treatment of its develop-
ment, see John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution
of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–
1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, R.I.: Na-
val War College Press, 2004), available at
www.usnwc.edu/press/. The signature date is
on p. 296.
4. Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age, pp.
92–93.
5. John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, eds.,
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Doc-
uments, Newport Paper 33 (Newport, R.I.:
Naval War College Press, 2008), pp. 7–8,
available at www.usnwc.edu/press/.
6. Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age, pp.
85–86.
7. Ibid., pp. 87, 98.
8. Hank C. Mustin, “The Role of the Navy and
Marines in the Norwegian Sea,” Naval War
College Review 39, no. 2 (March–April 1986),
pp. 2, 4.
9. Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age, p. 2.
10. Mustin, “The Role of the Navy and Marines
in the Norwegian Sea,” p. 2.
11. Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes, Norsk
forsvarshistorie, vol. 5, p. 101.
12. Mustin, “The Role of the Navy and Marines
in the Norwegian Sea,” p. 2.
13. Ibid., pp. 4–5.
14. Hattendorf and Swartz, eds., U.S. Naval
Strategy in the 1980s, pp. 74–77.
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15. Ibid., pp. 78, 82–84.
16. Ibid., pp. 85–86.
17. Ibid., p. 92.
18. Rolf Tamnes, “Integration and Screening:
The Two Faces of Norwegian Alliance Pol-
icy, 1945–1986,” in Forsvarsstudier: Defence
Studies VI Årbok for Forsvarshistorisk
forskningssenter—110 Forsvarets høgskole
1987, ed. Rolf Tamnes (Oslo: Tano, 1987),
and United States and the Cold War in the
High North, p. 298.
19. Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes, Norsk
forsvarshistorie, vol. 5, pp. 108–109.
20. Skogrand, Norsk forsvarshistorie, vol. 4, pp.
161–74; Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes,
Norsk forsvarshistorie, vol. 5, pp. 106–18.
21. Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in
the High North, pp. 289–94.
22. Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes, Norsk
forsvarshistorie, vol. 5, pp. 109–11.
23. Ibid., pp. 108–13.
24. Ibid., p. 63.
25. Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in
the High North, p. 262.
26. Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes, Norsk
forsvarshistorie, vol. 5, p. 114.
27. Ibid., pp. 101, 114–15.
28. Eric Grove, “The Superpowers and Secondary
Navies in Northern Waters during the Cold
War,” in Navies in Northern Waters 1721–
2000, ed. Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen
(London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 219.
29. Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes, Norsk
forsvarshistorie, vol. 5, p. 60.
30. Jacob Børresen, USA-marinens operasjoner i
Nord-Atlanteren og Norskehavet [U.S. Navy
Operations in the North Atlantic and the
Norwegian Sea], Norwegian Institute for In-
ternational Affairs Report 89 (Oslo: May
1985), p. 19.
31. Hattendorf and Swartz, eds., U.S. Naval
Strategy in the 1980s, p. 15.
32. This section is based on my own unpublished
notes from the time. During our work with
the Official History of Norway’s Defense Forces
from 2000 to 2004 I was unable to confirm
these arrangements in the COMNON ar-
chives. Interviews with colleagues from the
Norwegian Air Force have, however, rein-
forced my belief that my notes and memory
are correct in this matter.
33. Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes, Norsk
forsvarshistorie, vol. 5, pp. 63–64.
34. Once more, the only source of this section is
my own unpublished notes from my time as
DACOS Plans, Defence Command North
Norway, in 1985, confirmed through conver-
sations with officer colleagues I served with at
the time.
35. This section too is mostly based on my own
unpublished notes and recollections.
36. Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes, Norsk
forsvarshistorie, vol. 5, p. 103.
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In his thirty-two-year career in the Royal Norwegian
Navy before his retirement in 2000, Commodore
Børresen commanded the submarines HNoMS Kobben,
Ula, and Utsira, as well as the frigate Oslo. Ashore,
among numerous other postings, he served as Deputy
Assistant Chief of Staff (DACOS) for Plans in the Opera-
tions Division, Defence Command North Norway
(1985–86); military secretary to Defence Minister Johan
J. Holst (1986–88); DACOS for Organisation on the
Navy Staff of Headquarters, Defence Command Norway
(1988–90); Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) for Opera-
tions, Defence Command North Norway (1990–93);
Commander, Trøndelag Naval District (1993–94);
DACOS for Operations/Logistics at Supreme Headquar-
ters, Allied Powers Europe (1994–97) (assigned as Assis-
tant Director of Operations for Bosnia during Operation
JOINT ENDEAVOUR 1995–97); and Chief of the Navy
Staff, Headquarters, Defence Command Norway (1998–
2000). He attended the Norwegian Institute for Interna-
tional Affairs, the NATO Defence College in Rome, and
the National Defence College in Norway. Since his re-
tirement he has been a consultant and a member of
ministerial-level foreign-affairs and defense commit-
tees. He has published numerous articles, studies, re-
ports, and papers; he is a coauthor of volume 5 of
Norway’s official defense history (2004) and a coauthor
of or contributor to four other books.
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